The Locus of Moral Agency: Reconciling the Virtuous Character and the Relational Self
Abstract
Traditional moral philosophy has frequently been critiqued for its "agent-blind" obsession with abstract principles and rule-governed action, often ignoring the rich psychological and social complexity of the individual. In response, Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics and Carol Gilligan’s ethics of care have emerged as powerful alternatives, shifting the focus of inquiry from the act to the actor. Hursthouse locates moral agency within the cultivation of a stable, virtuous character, while Gilligan identifies it within the maintenance of webbed, relational responsibilities. This paper compares these two frameworks, analyzing whether virtue ethics provides a more stable foundation for moral value than the relational self. Ultimately, I argue that while they present different starting points, they are not fundamentally incompatible; rather, they serve as complementary dimensions of a comprehensive moral life, where virtuous character provides the strength to navigate the complexities of relational care.
I. Introduction: The Crisis of Agent-Blindness
For centuries, the landscape of moral philosophy was dominated by frameworks that prioritized the evaluation of specific actions. Deontological systems, obsessed with universal duties, and utilitarian calculus, obsessed with the maximization of aggregate utility, treated the moral agent as an interchangeable, transparent container for logical application. Critics argue this tradition remains "agent-blind," stripping the individual of their history, character, and social context.
The emergence of virtue ethics and the ethics of care represents a decisive turn away from these sterile abstractions. Rosalind Hursthouse, drawing heavily from the Aristotelian tradition, reintroduces the importance of a flourishing, virtuous character. Simultaneously, Carol Gilligan’s developmental psychology challenges the universalist assumptions of moral growth, proposing an ethics centered on the preservation of relational connections. To determine the true locus of moral agency, we must examine how these two thinkers reconstruct the identity of the moral being—and whether their foundations can peacefully coexist.
II. Hursthouse and the Locus of Flourishing
Rosalind Hursthouse argues that the central question of moral philosophy should not be "What should I do?" but rather "What kind of person should I be?". For Hursthouse, moral agency is anchored in the concept of eudaimonia, or flourishing. Agency is located within the individual’s commitment to acquiring and practicing virtues—dispositions that are necessary for a human being to live a good life.
Hursthouse’s virtuous character is defined by:
Stability: The agent possesses ingrained dispositions that remain consistent across varied social contexts.
Practical Wisdom (Phronesis): The agent does not simply follow a rulebook; they exercise judgment to determine what is required in a particular situation.
Rationality: Virtuous actions are those that a virtuous person—one who has developed the right internal motivations—would perform.
In this framework, moral agency is an achievement. It is a long-term project of self-construction where the agent’s internal psychological structure becomes the primary source of ethical legitimacy. Value is not something "added" to an action by a set of external calculations; it is the natural expression of a well-ordered, virtuous character.
III. Gilligan and the Locus of Relation
Carol Gilligan provides a stark contrast by challenging the "justice-oriented" focus of traditional moral development. Through her research, Gilligan identified a "different voice"—a perspective that views moral agency not as the cultivation of an isolated character, but as an ongoing negotiation of interconnectedness.
For Gilligan, moral agency is defined by:
Relationality: The moral self is not an autonomous island but a node in a web of dependencies and attachments.
Responsiveness: Agency is exercised when an individual actively attends to the specific needs of others within their particular relational network.
Contextual Responsibility: Rather than seeking abstract consistency, the agent navigates the complex, often conflicting demands of those to whom they are connected.
Where Hursthouse emphasizes the "vertical" development of the self toward a virtuous ideal, Gilligan emphasizes the "horizontal" maintenance of relationships. The locus of agency is moved from the internal character of the individual to the "in-between" space of the relationship.
IV. Comparative Synthesis: Foundation vs. Context
The tension between these two frameworks can be summarized through their diverging conceptual structures:
Critics often argue that virtue ethics provides a more stable foundation because it gives the agent a clear internal compass. If I am virtuous, I have a reliable guide for action. Conversely, the ethics of care is often accused of being overly subjective or "chancy," as it depends entirely on the unpredictable needs of others.
However, this critique misses the nuance of Gilligan’s position. The relational self is not "unstable"; it is deeply sensitive. While Hursthouse’s virtuous agent seeks the "Golden Mean" of excellence, Gilligan’s agent seeks the "relational balance" of care. Both recognize that moral agency requires a departure from rigid, top-down rule-following.
V. Reconciliation: The Virtuous Caretaker
Are these theories fundamentally incompatible? The perceived incompatibility stems from an exaggerated dichotomy between the "autonomous agent" and the "relational self." A careful analysis reveals they are mutually reinforcing.
To be a truly effective caretaker in the sense Gilligan describes, one requires the very virtues Hursthouse identifies:
Compassion and Patience: These are Aristotelian virtues that are essential for the maintenance of a web of care.
Practical Wisdom: One needs phronesis to judge when a relationship requires care and when it requires the enforcement of boundaries.
Justice: Virtue ethics’ focus on justice provides a necessary check, ensuring that relational care does not slide into partiality or cronyism.
Conversely, Hursthouse’s virtuous agent, if they ignore the relational context of their actions, risks becoming rigid, self-righteous, or detached. The virtuous agent requires the "voice of care" to remain tethered to the humanity of those around them.
Instead of viewing them as incompatible, we can see moral agency as a bipolar system. Virtue ethics provides the internal strength (the character) to survive the stresses of life, while the ethics of care provides the external sensitivity (the relationships) that gives that life value.
VI. Conclusion
The locus of moral agency is not found exclusively in the isolated character of the individual or the web of relationships, but in the dynamic movement between them. Rosalind Hursthouse’s focus on virtuous character provides the indispensable "hardware" of moral life—the disciplined dispositions and wisdom required to stand firm. Carol Gilligan’s relational self provides the "software"—the sensitive, empathetic capacity to navigate the needs of others.
By reconciling these approaches, we move toward a more comprehensive account of the moral being. A virtuous person who lacks a capacity for care is incomplete, just as a caring person who lacks a firm foundation of virtuous character is unstable. Together, they offer a foundation for moral value that is both robust and deeply human—a foundation that accounts for both the strength of the self and the importance of the other.
Works Cited
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Translated by Terence Irwin, Hackett Publishing, 1999.
Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development. Harvard University Press, 1982.
Hursthouse, Rosalind. On Virtue Ethics. Oxford University Press, 1999.
Noddings, Nel. Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education. University of California Press, 1984.
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