Personal Identity Beyond the Self

 

Reevaluating the Criterion of Persistence

The philosophical discourse on personal identity—the metaphysical question of what constitutes an individual's persistence through time—achieved significant rigor with the work of thinkers like Harold Noonan. His contributions, rooted in the analytic tradition, rightly compel an exhaustive inventory of the necessary and sufficient conditions for an individual's continued existence. One should reject any flippant or equivocal representation of such serious scholarly contributions.

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I. Noonan's Criterion and the Limits of the Physical

Noonan's analysis primarily explores the sufficiency of physical and psychological continuity as criteria for identity.

A. The Physical Criterion (Bodily and Brain-Based)

Noonan's work engages critically with the Bodily Criterion, which posits that persistence requires physical continuity of the whole organism.

• The thought experiment involving an individual claiming to $\text{be}$ Napoleon, possessing Napoleon's apparent memories, directly challenges this view. The individual's body remains distinct from Napoleon's body, indicating that body alone fails to $\text{act}$ as the definitive condition.

• Noonan subsequently foregrounds the Brain Criterion: the identity of an individual $X$ at time $t^1$ with an individual $Y$ at time $t^2$ depends on the physical continuity of the brain. This part $\text{appears}$ most responsible for maintaining a consistent personal history. The success of a hypothetical brain transplant would, by this criterion, transfer the person, not merely an organ.

B. The Psychological Criterion (Lockean Continuity)

Noonan also draws upon John Locke's core insight: personal identity depends on the continuity of consciousness, primarily manifested by memory.

• This forms the basis of the Psychological Criterion, which claims identity persists through the continuous connection of an individual's psychological states (memories, beliefs, habits, character traits) over time.

• The persistence of habits and continuous character traits across different temporal phases underscores this aspect. The "I's union of character" resists immediate change when, for example, a person switches academic majors; the 'I' remains conceptually continuous, even as its descriptive reality changes.

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II. Revision: Parthood, Temporal Entities, and the Multiplicity of Identity

One should consider Noonan's underlying assumption: the unitary nature of personal identity. A departure from this "Simple View" compels us to consider the implications of multiplicity and vague persistence.

A. The Challenge of Temporal Part-hood

The notion that we exist not as single entities but as a collection of temporal parts—distinct entities existing at different times—profoundly challenges the singular view.

• If I remove a tumor, I excise a part that shared my physical composition yet failed to share my personal identity. Similarly, replacing a major organ (a heart transplant) fails to alter the core identity, suggesting that not all physical parts possess equal metaphysical weight.

• The gruesome thought experiment concerning the self and severed limbs or a severed head highlights the cognitive bias toward a singular point of view. We instinctively locate the self either in the head (the site of consciousness) or in the whole body, but rarely consider the potential for multiple, distinct personal identities existing across different temporal moments.

B. The Logic of Parthood (Lego-hood)

The analogy of $\text{parthood}$ or 'Lego-hood' offers a precise way to model this complex structure. Personal identity $\text{involves}$ molecular building blocks (particles) that undergo continuous replacement and reorganization.

• The Ship of Theseus paradox aptly demonstrates the problem of persistence through change. If we replace all components, does the object retain its original identity? In the context of the self, if every particle and every memory changes over a lifetime, where exactly does the singular "I" reside?

• The singular reference to personal mind versus personal body breaks down. $\text{We}$ $\text{are}$ composite, multi-part machines. Group identity and stereotyping mirror this error, treating a diverse collective of distinct individuals as a singular, undifferentiated entity, which further reinforces the societal illusion of singular identity.

C. Identity as a Trans-dimensional Process

Identity should $\text{not}$ constitute a single, static phenomenon but $\text{function}$ as an ever-changing process of manifesting temporal parts.

• Behavioral and Cognitive Change: When a gender non-conformist transitions, the defiance $\text{involves}$ more than just physical changes; it changes the social and psychological dimensions of identity through time. When one devours information (or $\text{ingests}$ alcohol), the contents of the brain change, reflecting a continuous revision of the self's reality.

• The Unknowable Self: The persistence of identity becomes a lifelong assumption. Our core identity remains elusive, unknowable in the absolute sense, but its manifestations—the many varied temporal actions orchestrated over time—serve as the only documentable reality.

The final assertion remains: Personal identity constitutes a dynamic, evolving construction, much like a choose-your-own-ending book. No single, universal criterion will capture the complexity of all individuals, whose distinct temporal parts continually redefine the $\text{self}$ within a framework of ever-changing existence.

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Do the implications of this temporal part-hood thesis compromise the ethical foundation of moral responsibility? If no single, unitary 'I' persists, who should we hold accountable for past actions?

A Revision of the Determinism Debate

 

The Coercive Logic of Freedom

The examination of free will—a concept often contested as incoherent—requires rigorously defining the terms and scrutinizing the causal structures invoked by the primary positions: Hard Determinism, Libertarianism, and Compatibilism. One should resist the premature assumption that a choice among these theories necessarily exists.

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I. Conceptual Incoherence and Causal Efficacy

The central difficulty in this discourse resides in the equivocal and sometimes incoherent application of causal language.

Question (I): Which premise of each theory appears more ineffective at explaining immanent/transient causation?

• Hard Determinism (Ineffective Premise): The thesis that every event, including every human action, results as a direct consequence of the laws of nature acting on antecedent circumstances. This framework renders immanent causation (agent causation, where an agent initiates a new causal chain) wholly unintelligible. If only unbroken chains of transient causation (event-to-event causality) exist, the agent's "will" plays no originating role.

• Libertarianism (Ineffective Premise): The claim that some actions appear free because they originate independently of motivational causes. This framework struggles to explain transient causation following an uncaused act. If a free act possesses no antecedent cause, its relation to the subsequent chain of physical events appears arbitrary—a random anomaly that lacks coherence with the observed laws of nature.

• Compatibilism (Ineffective Premise): The contention that free will and determinism prove logically compatible. This view often struggles to define "can" without appealing to a counterfactual (i.e., The agent could have acted otherwise if the agent had desired otherwise). This conditional definition avoids the deterministic constraint but fails to address the foundational problem: If the agent's desires result from antecedent deterministic chains, the agent cannot fundamentally originate a different desire.

Question (II): Are the terms used equivocally, or do they appear obscure?

The primary challenge involves the term "can."

• Libertarian "Can": Implies a categorical ability to act otherwise, even with all antecedent circumstances and motivational states held constant. This appears deeply inconsistent with the notion of a rational, identifiable agent.

• Compatibilist "Can": Denotes a hypothetical ability, signifying the absence of external constraint or coercion (Hume/Ayer). This applies the term equivocally by shifting the focus from metaphysical causality to mere psychological or physical capacity.

The concept of "free will" itself appears incoherent if, as Peter Van Inwagen suggests, it cannot find a consistent logical space within a deterministic universe. To act freely while also having an action determined necessitates an appeal to two contradictory modes of explanation.

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II. The Prison of Desire and Coercion

The incompatibility thesis gains strength when we observe actions driven by powerful internal or external forces.

A. External Coercion and Frankfurt's Analysis

Consider the pre-determined robbery scenario. Surrendering a wallet to a gunman constitutes an act coerced by the instinct for self-preservation. One performs the action, but one certainly did not will the entire event or its consequence.

Harry Frankfurt's framework sharpens this by focusing on volition: A free action proceeds from a desire that one wants to have (second-order volition). In the robbery, the victim desires to surrender the wallet to save one's life. Even though the external circumstance coerces the situation, the victim identifies with the desire for survival. The action thus seems "free" in a compatibilist sense, yet remains determined by the desire-hierarchy and the external threat.

B. Internal Coercion and the Addict

The case of the addict presents a scenario of internal coercion that resembles Locke's locked room: The individual desires to stop using a substance but cannot act on this desire because a deeper, self-organized compulsion (the addiction) controls the will.

• The addict's $\text{will}$ remains unfree because the $\text{will}$ fails to organize itself toward the desired outcome.

• The action of taking the substance, though stemming from an internal desire, appears unfree because the agent does not identify with that desire at a higher volitional level. The substance, not the self, dictates the action. The addict cannot perform the action they $\text{want}$ to perform; the will appears bound by an irresistible cause.

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III. The Limits of Responsibility and $\text{The}$ $\text{Can}$ Hypothesis

The implications for moral responsibility loom large. If Hard Determinism obtains, one's actions proceed as a result of pre-programmed events, thus diminishing or eliminating responsibility.

Consider the student (J) and the threatening professor (TP) scenario. Assume determinism holds.

• The statement "J could have done better" must mean: "J would have performed the action differently had J wanted to perform the action differently."

• The statement "TP could have helped J" must mean: "TP would have helped J had TP wanted to help J."

In both cases, the action was determined by the antecedent desires. If the universe possesses a deterministic nature, and time re-starts ($n$ number of times), J and TP will perform the exact same actions because all prior events, including their desires and their interpretation of the term "can," will re-occur identically.

The belief that J $\text{can}$ choose otherwise only holds if the underlying causal mechanism that generates J's desires can somehow produce an uncaused variation. Indeterministic absurdity—the notion that an action results from pure randomness—provides no better basis for moral responsibility than determinism. An action that happens randomly lacks an identifiable link to the agent's character or moral code; it thus constitutes an event, not a choice.

Therefore, the choice among the theories appears pre-set, not free. If determinism $\text{proves}$ true, no sufficient space exists for a coherent definition of free will. Freedom, if it exists, must reside within the deterministic chains, finding expression in the self's capacity to identify with its desires and actions, even while recognizing that those desires themselves result from a fixed causal universe.

A Defense of Non-Reductive Mentality

 

Psycho-Interactional-Substance-Simulations of Eliminative Dualism ($\text{PISSED}$) 

The persistent philosophical conundrum regarding the nature of consciousness and its relation to the physical realm demands a rigorous examination of established frameworks. This essay defends a novel approach, Psycho-Interactional-Substance-Simulations of Eliminative Dualism ($\text{PISSED}$), advocating for a revised substance dualism that necessitates the elimination of purely physicalist accounts of mentality.

I. Defining the Core Conflict: Dualism vs. Monism

The debate concerning consciousness fundamentally involves two major theoretical camps:

A. Dualist Frameworks

Dualism posits that reality comprises two fundamental types of entities.

Substance Dualism (Revised Cartesian): One recognizes matter as a physical substance and the mind as a non-physical substance. One accesses the brain with an X-ray, but one cannot access thoughts themselves by the same means. This non-physicality indicates an ontological separation.

Property Dualism: Matter constitutes a composite with two distinct sets of properties: physical and non-physical. This view entails the challenge of epiphenomenalism (mental processes result from physical events, bearing no causal power) and interactionism (mental and physical substances exert mutual causal influence).

Elemental Property Dualism: This framework carefully distinguishes fundamental properties (e.g., measurements in time, space, mass, force) from irreducible mental properties (e.g., awareness, qualia). This approach maintains that mental properties resist reduction to physical laws and do not merely emerge from them; they possess a foundational, non-contingent status.

B. Materialist Frameworks

Materialism, or physicalism, insists that all that exists possesses a physical nature.

Reductive Materialism (Identity Theory): This view asserts that mental contents, events, and states equal physical matters, possessing numerical identity. Pain, for instance, amounts to a specific firing pattern of C-fibers.

Functionalism: Mental states function as a specific, definable causal role—a computational process realized by material substance. The mind operates as a functional machine.

Eliminative Materialism ($\text{EM}$): $\text{EM}$ rejects the influence of folk psychological concepts (e.g., belief, desire, mind) due to their explanatory failure. Proponents maintain that eliminating these primitive concepts will enable their replacement by a future, coherent neuro-scientific lexicon.

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II. The Incoherence of Materialist Reduction

A robust defense of dualism requires demonstrating the conceptual deficiencies within physicalism.

A. The Argument from Qualia (What-it-is-like)

The most potent challenge to physicalism involves qualia, the subjective, non-physical qualitative essence of experience.

The thought experiment involving Mary, the neuroscientist confined to a black-and-white room, illuminates this deficit:

Premise (I): Mary possesses all the empirical, physical truths ($\text{PT}$) regarding the color red.

Premise (II): Mary does not know what experiencing red involves until she leaves the room.

Conclusion (III): Some knowledge concerning lived-experience (Qualia Truths, $\text{QT}$) does not constitute physical truth or substance. Therefore, physicalism falters.

The relationship between $\text{PT}$ and $\text{QT}$ resists logical entailment:

If physical truths a priori entail qualia truths ($\text{PT}\to \text{QT}$), then Mary should have known red. She did not.

The relationship between $\text{PT}$ and $\text{QT}$ appears neither a priori sufficient nor necessary.

Thus, physicalism, which claims $\text{PT}$ covers all truths, stands as a false model of reality.

B. The Inconsistencies of Eliminative Materialism

$\text{EM}$ attempts to reject folk concepts like 'belief' as incoherent. However, the formulation of this rejection relies on a self-defeating structure:

The advocate of $\text{EM}$ vocalizes the belief that valid beliefs do not exist. This act performs the very mental state it purports to eliminate. The theory requires a prerequisite experience of a language system to explain and prove itself, yet denies the existence of the cognitive content (belief/intention) driving that explanation.

C. The Failure of Identity and Functionalism

Identity Theory ($\text{MT}1$) neglects the possibility of $\text{true}$ or $\text{false}$ propositional attitudes, which can conflict and cause contradictions. If Leibniz's Law holds (if $x=y$, they share all properties), mental events and brain states should possess identical properties. Yet, mental events possess properties (e.g., truth value, intentional content) that brain states lack.

Functionalism ($\text{MT}2$) cannot account for the Inverted Spectrum Argument (two people with identical functional states but inverted qualia) or the Chinese Room Argument, which refutes the claim that mere computation constitutes genuine understanding or consciousness.

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III. The $\text{PISSED}$ Alternative: An Interactionist Framework

The $\text{PISSED}$ framework, interpreted as a Psycho-interactional substance-simulation of emergent dualism, acknowledges the irreducibility of mental phenomena while allowing for a causal connection with the body.

A. Irreducibility and the Mental Reality System

The notion of irreducibility states that reality cannot reduce to fundamental physical matter because language, especially concerning emerging concepts, sometimes remains hidden from our comprehension. New terminology (e.g., a future neuro-scientific term) must first exist as a non-physical form or concept before circulating socially.

Consciousness manifests as an emergent non-physical substance that contains intrinsic qualitative properties (psycho-interactional substances). These properties—encoded visual, audio, tactile, and psycho-developmental memory—resist reduction to physical materials alone.

B. Intentionality and Psycho-Cognitive States

Intentionality, or the property of a mental state directed toward an object, provides the psycho-interactional structure of mental activity.

Intentionality equals having a desire or a belief.

Psycho-cognitive states equal an intention toward achieving or confirming the conditions that satisfy that desire or belief.

Intentional states constitute a simulation organized by a non-physical Mind (or a non-physical substance). This Mental Reality System ($\text{MRS}$), which operates outside the full comprehension of the material world, contains the non-physical proof for the mind's ontological separation.

The $\text{MRS}$ functions as the core of $\text{PISSED}$'s thesis. The dualist framework includes essential qualitative particulars and non-material realities that physicalists neglect.

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Conclusion

Materialism offers an incomplete and ultimately incoherent account of conscious experience, failing to accommodate the epistemic gap of qualia and the logical self-defeat of its eliminative tenets.

The evidence presented supports the necessity of a revised substance dualism. Our mind/consciousness appears non-physical but interacts with the substance constituting our physical bodies. Mental events result from non-physical processes based on substances and corresponding properties that operate within our inner mental reality systems ($\text{MRS}$).

The $\text{PISSED}$ framework thus stands as a viable alternative, maintaining that physicalism constitutes a false simulation that one should eliminate in favor of an explanatory system that accounts for the full spectrum of subjective experience.

On the Semantics of Identity

 Revisiting Frege's Puzzling Dichotomy

Identifying a critical historical juncture in the philosophy of language:
the necessity of moving beyond rudimentary semantic theories to account for the
cognitive complexity of identity statements. The foundational challenge, as articulated
by Gottlob Frege in his seminal 1892 paper, "On Sense and Reference," is not merely
a linguistic quirk but a deep, structural problem regarding the relationship between
thought and reality.

I. The Formal Structure of the Puzzle

The initial proposition, "A = A ∧ A = B," succinctly captures the formal paradox.
Consider the following two sentences:

"The Morning Star is the Morning Star." (A=A)

"The Morning Star is the Evening Star." (A=B)

The problem is two-fold:

Epistemic Difference: Both statements are, in fact, true
(they share the same astronomical referent: the planet Venus). However,
their cognitive value is profoundly different. Statement (1) is a trivial,
a priori truth, a mere tautology that conveys no new information.
Statement (2), conversely, is a significant,
a posteriori discovery of astronomy. If a semantic theory holds that the only
meaning of a term is its referent, then (1) and (2) should be cognitively
identical—a conclusion empirically false.

The Problem of Informative Identity: If the referent (Bedeutung) alone
constitutes the meaning of a proper name, then the truth of an identity statement
A=B should be known simply by knowing the referents of A and B. Yet, as shown,
it requires empirical investigation.

Frege's solution was to posit a third semantic layer: Sense (Sinn). The sense is the mode of presentation of the referent. Both "Morning Star" and "Evening Star" refer to the same object (Venus), but they present that object via different descriptive criteria or conceptual content. The meaning of an identity statement A=B is thus the recognition that two different senses converge upon a single referent.

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II. Proper Names, Propositional Attitudes, and Cognitive Content

The examples—the favorite cow, Muhammad Ali/Cassius Clay, and the best friend—are excellent instances of how this Fregean framework extends to the problem of Propositional Attitude Ascriptions (beliefs, desires, knowledge).

When the ordinary use of names is considered, we enter into opaque contexts where the principle of substitutivity of identicals fails.

The Cow and the Social Masses:

• Agent 1 (The Farmer): Believes "Cow A has positive attributes."
  (Sense 1: favorite cow)

• Agent 2 (The Consumer): Desires "To eat Cow B." (Sense 2: edible substance)
  In reality, Cow A = Cow B (they are the same physical entity).
  However, substituting "Cow B" for "Cow A" in the farmer's belief leads
  to the false ascription: The Farmer believes "Cow B is inedible,"
  which may not hold in the context of the farm's eventual purpose.
  The mental meaning (the sense) determines the truth value of the
  propositional attitude, even when the referent remains constant.

Muhammad Ali / Cassius Clay: The identity Muhammad Ali = Cassius Clay is informative. The observer who knows the referent via the sense "the boxer Cassius Clay" may rationally and non-culpably deny that "the boxer Muhammad Ali" is the same individual, until they are presented with the empirical (or historical) fact of the name change. This highlights the crucial role of sense in determining cognitive content.

Your formulation concerning a Justified, True, Belief (JTB) is a precise application:
A and A1 differ in mental meaning if one can rationally hold A to be JTB while remaining skeptical of A1. The difference lies in the sense by which the two propositions are apprehended.

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III. The Limits of Reference: Abstracta and Empty Names

Our source rightly pivots to two other critical areas where
the Sense/Reference distinction is tested:

Empty Names (The Non-Referent): The classic example, often debated
by Russell, is "the present King of France."
This term clearly has a sense (a set of descriptive properties),
which allows us to meaningfully think about it, despite the fact that it currently
lacks a referent (Bedeutung). This reinforces the idea that sense is the primary
bearer of meaning, independent of the external existence of the referent.

Abstract Entities and Mental States: The question concerning whether names
and numbers are "abstract entities" is central to Fregean ontology.

• For Frege, the sense of a proper name (which includes numbers) is an objective,
  abstract entity—neither a physical object nor a subjective mental state—that
  exists in a "third realm" (the realm of thoughts or Gedanken). This objectivity
  is what ensures that two different people can grasp the same sense, even if
  their subjective mental images or ideas (your "mental states") differ.

• Introspection and "mental states" are relegated to the non-objective,
  psychological realm of Ideas (Vorstellungen), which are irrelevant
  to the truth and meaning of language. Sense is the necessary mediating
  layer that connects the subjective (ideas) to the objective (reference).

In sum, what is termed "Frege's Proper Puzzle" is not a flaw in his identity concept,
but his elegant and profound solution to the limitations of simple referential semantics.
The puzzle reveals that meaning is not merely reference, but the manner in which reference is achieved and cognitively assimilated.